REFORMULATING EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION IN FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM THROUGH A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGICAL LITERATURE

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Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mereformulasi pemahaman tentang justifikasi epistemik melalui analisis perbandingan revisi foundationalism dan coherentism dalam literatur epistemologi kontemporer. Fokus utama penelitian diarahkan pada bagaimana asumsi dasar mengenai fondasi, koherensi, regres epistemik, dan normativitas pembenaran direvisi, apa keterbatasan konseptual dan metajustifikatif yang masih bertahan, serta bagaimana sintesis komparatif memungkinkan perumusan kerangka justifikasi yang melampaui dikotomi klasik tanpa jatuh ke dalam dogmatisme atau relativisme epistemik. Metode yang digunakan adalah kajian literatur naratif non–systematic literature review terhadap artikel-artikel jurnal terindeks Scopus yang relevan, dengan analisis isi konseptual dan perbandingan argumentatif sebagai teknik utama. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa foundationalism dan coherentism sama-sama direvisi secara signifikan: fondasi dipahami sebagai sumber legitimasi awal yang fallible dan revisable, koherensi direkonstruksi sebagai struktur normatif multidimensional, dan regres epistemik diperlakukan sebagai fenomena struktural yang dikelola secara reflektif. Namun, penelitian juga menemukan bahwa revisi-revisi tersebut belum sepenuhnya menyelesaikan problem justifikasi epistemik karena masih menyisakan keterbatasan metajustifikatif, terutama terkait dasar normativitas. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa justifikasi epistemik dalam epistemologi kontemporer paling tepat dipahami sebagai proses normatif yang dinamis dan pluralistik, serta berkontribusi dengan memetakan secara sistematis pola revisi konseptual yang melampaui dikotomi foundationalism–coherentism.

***Kata kunci**: Reformulating Epistemic Justification; Foundationalism And Coherentism; Comparative Study; Contemporary Epistemological Literature*

Abstract

This research aims to reformulate the understanding of epistemic justification through a comparative analysis of revisional foundationalism and coherentism in the contemporary epistemological literature. The main focus of the research is directed at how basic assumptions regarding foundation, coherence, epistemic regression, and justification normativity are revised, what conceptual and metajustificative limitations remain, as well as how comparative synthesis allows for the formulation of a framework of justification that goes beyond classical dichotomies without falling into dogmatism

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or epistemic relativism. The method used is a non-systematic literature review of relevant Scopus indexed journal articles, with conceptual content analysis and argumentative comparison as the main techniques. The results show that foundationalism and coherentism are both significantly revised: foundations are understood as a fallible and revisable source of initial legitimacy, coherence is reconstructed as a multidimensional normative structure, and epistemic regression is treated as a reflexively managed structural phenomenon. However, the study also found that these revisions have not completely solved the problem of epistemic justification because they still leave metajustificative limitations, especially related to the basis of normativity. This study concludes that epistemic justification in contemporary epistemology is best understood as a dynamic and pluralistic normative process, and contributes by systematically mapping patterns of conceptual revision that go beyond the foundationalism–coherentism dichotomy.

Keywords: *Reformulating Epistemic Justification; Foundationalism And Coherentism; Comparative Study; Contemporary Epistemological Literature*

A. Introduction

The debate over epistemic justification is one of the most fundamental and ongoing discourses in contemporary epistemology, especially in the conceptual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalism classically views that the structure of knowledge must lead to basic beliefs that are non-inferential and capable of stopping epistemic regression, while coherentism rejects such epistemic hierarchies and places the coherence of belief systems as the primary source of justification. However, the contemporary epistemological literature shows that this binary opposition is increasingly being questioned, both through internal critiques of individual positions and through conceptual reconstruction efforts that go beyond the dichotomy. Recent studies have confirmed that the problem of epistemic justification can no longer be reduced to a purely structural question, but is closely related to issues of normativity, fallibility, revisability, and epistemic practice of the subject; Thus, the focus of the debate shifts from the search for a definitive theory of justification to an analysis of how these theories are revised in the face of ever-evolving philosophical criticism. This shift marks a post-classical phase in contemporary epistemology, in which foundationalism and coherentism are no longer maintained as exclusive, static positions, but rather as dynamic theoretical traditions open to revision. This condition is the main background of this research. (Quine et al., n.d.) (Gondim, n.d.)

In the context of foundationalism, contemporary literature has consistently shown the failure of classical versions that presuppose infallible and self-justifying fundamental beliefs. Criticism of foundationalism highlights that perceptual experience and basic beliefs are always

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fallible and cannot serve as an absolute stopping point for epistemic regression without falling into dogmatism or arbitrariness; Various revisional efforts then led to moderate foundationalism, which recognized the role of experience as a source of initial justification, but still left open the possibility of correction through reflection and the coherence of broader belief systems. This revision shows that epistemic foundations are no longer understood as final foundations immune to criticism, but rather as functional elements in a dynamic structure of justification. Thus, contemporary foundationalism no longer offers definitive solutions to the problem of epistemic regression but seeks to manage it reflectively. This shift suggests that epistemic foundations are conceptually and normatively revised, rather than abandoned entirely. However, the literature also confirms that this revision still leaves metajustifying questions about the normative legitimacy of the epistemic foundation itself (SMITHIES 2014, n.d.) (Vaassen, 2016) (Berghofer, 2019) *Muhammad+Andry, n.d.)*

Meanwhile, coherentism as an alternative to foundationalism has also undergone significant transformations in the contemporary epistemological literature. Classical criticism of coherentism highlights the problem of circularity and the weak relationship between coherence and truth, which has the potential to lead to epistemic relativism. In response to this critique, contemporary coherentism revises the concept of coherence from mere logical consistency to a more complex relational structure, involving explanatory, probabilistic, and normative dimensions; Coherence is no longer understood as a single property, but rather as a network of relations judged on the basis of the norms of rationality and epistemic responsibility of the subject. This revision aims to maintain the anti-hierarchical commitment of coherentism without sacrificing the demands of justification normativity. However, the literature also shows that revised coherentism still faces metajustificative challenges, particularly regarding the normative basis of the coherence standards used. Thus, contemporary coherentism moves from a static model to a reflective model, but it has not completely solved the problem of epistemic justification. (Stoneham, n.d.) (Glass, 2006) (Koscholke & Jekel, 2017) (Amaya, 2008) (Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017)

The shift in focus in contemporary epistemology is also evident in the way the problem of epistemic regression is understood. If in the classical debate regression is seen as a threat that must be stopped absolutely, the cutting-edge literature instead shows a tendency to accept regression as a structural feature of epistemic justification that needs to be

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managed, not eliminated. Moderate foundationalism accepts that epistemic foundations are temporary and revisable, while normative coherentism develops evaluative mechanisms to prevent destructive circularity. Thus, epistemic justification is no longer understood as a final state, but rather as a constantly updated reflective process. The normative dimension is at the center of attention in this shift, since justification is not only concerned with the structure of beliefs, but also with epistemic practices, the responsibility of the subject, and the context in which the beliefs are used. The literature consistently rejects dogmatic and static models of justification and instead emphasizes the dynamic and contextual nature of epistemic justification. It is this shift that shapes the state of the art of contemporary epistemology. (Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017) (Harvey, 2024)

Nonetheless, a review of the literature shows a significant research gap. Most contemporary epistemological studies tend to be partial, focusing on critiquing or revising one position—both foundationalism and coherentism—without conducting a symmetrical and systematic comparative analysis. As a result, the pattern of conceptual revision in both traditions is often fragmented and difficult to map comprehensively. In addition, many studies operate at the first theoretical level without explicitly reflecting on the metajustifying implications of the revisions made. The concept of epistemic justification is often used implicitly without adequate metatheoretical clarification, thus leaving normative ambiguity; This research gap shows the need for studies that explicitly make the revision of epistemic justification the main object of analysis, rather than merely a side implication of criticism of a particular theory. Without this kind of comparative analysis, it is difficult to judge whether the revisions of foundationalism and coherentism are convergent, divergent, or complementary. (Gondim, n.d.) (Muhammad+Andry, n.d.) (Mortini, 2025)

Based on this background, this research is important because it seeks to fill the research gap in contemporary epistemological discourse. This research does not aim to defend or reject foundationalism or coherentism unilaterally, but rather to analyze how contemporary literature revises the concept of epistemic justification in both traditions. Using a comparative study of the literature as the main methodology, this study focuses on basic assumptions regarding foundation, coherence, epistemic regression, and normativity of justification as reconstructed in recent works. This approach allows mapping the pattern of conceptual revision that has been scattered in the literature and has not been systematized comparatively. In addition, this study also highlights the

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conceptual and metajustificative limitations that are still maintained in these revisions, thus explaining why the problem of epistemic justification has not been fully resolved. Thus, this research has strong theoretical relevance in the context of contemporary epistemology.

The main objective of this study is to reformulate the understanding of epistemic justification through a comparative analysis of revisional foundationalism and coherentism in the contemporary epistemological literature. In particular, this study aims, first, to map how contemporary literature revises the concept of epistemic justification in both traditions, especially related to foundation, coherence, epistemic regression, and normativity of justification. Second, this study aims to identify the conceptual and metajustificative limitations that persist in the revisions of foundationalism and coherentism, and to explain why these revisions have not fully resolved the problem of epistemic justification. Third, this study aims to formulate a possible framework for the revision of epistemic justification that goes beyond the classical dichotomy between foundationalism and coherentism without falling into dogmatism or epistemic relativism. Thus, this research is descriptive-analytical as well as reflective-constructive.

In line with this goal, the formulation of this research problem is formulated in three main research questions. First, how does the contemporary epistemological literature revise the concepts of epistemic justification in foundationalism and coherentism, particularly in relation to the basic assumptions about foundation, coherence, epistemic regression, and normativity of justification? Second, what are the conceptual and metajustificative limitations that are still maintained in the revisions of foundationalism and coherentism according to the contemporary literature, and why have these revisions not fully resolved the problem of epistemic justification? Third, how does the comparative synthesis of contemporary epistemological literature allow for the formulation of a revised framework of epistemic justification that goes beyond the classical dichotomy between foundationalism and coherentism without falling into dogmatism or epistemic relativism? By formulating the problem explicitly and integrated, this research is expected to make a significant conceptual contribution to the understanding of epistemic justification in contemporary epistemology.

B. Methodology

This study uses a narrative literature review (non-SLR) design that focuses on conceptual and comparative analysis of the revision of epistemic justification in foundationalism and coherentism as discussed in contemporary epistemological literature. This approach was chosen because the purpose of the

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research was not to conduct a quantitative mapping of publication trends, but to deeply reconstruct the philosophical arguments, conceptual assumptions, and metajustifying problems that have developed in the latest discourse; The subject of this research is not an individual or an empirical population, but (Gondim, n.d.) (Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017) academic texts in the form of epistemological journal articles that are indexed by Scopus and explicitly discuss epistemic justification, foundationalism, coherentism, or conceptual revision of both. A sample of literature is purposively determined based on its thematic relevance, depth of philosophical argumentation, and contribution to contemporary debates regarding epistemic regression, justification normativity, and the structure of justification, as reflected in the works you have collected (e.g.; ; (Quine et al., n.d.) (Berghofer, 2019) (Stoneham, n.d.) (Muhammad+Andry, n.d.) .

The research instruments in this study are in the form of a conceptual categorization framework prepared by the researcher to identify and compare theoretical positions in each article, including: (1) basic assumptions about foundation or coherence, (2) how to deal with epistemic regression, (3) conception of justification normativity, and (4) metajustificative implications of the proposed revision. The data collection procedure is carried out through critical and repeated reading of each article, recording the main arguments, and grouping findings into consistent analytical categories. Data analysis was carried out by conceptual content analysis and argumentative comparison methods, namely examining similarities, differences, and patterns of convergence and tension between the revision of foundationalism and coherentism in the literature; The validity of the analysis is maintained through the consistency of the use of categories, the traceability of arguments in the source text, and critical reflection on the epistemological assumptions used. With this procedure, the research method can be replicated by other researchers who wish to examine the revision of epistemic justification in a similar corpus of contemporary epistemological literature. (Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017) (Gondim, n.d.) .

C. Findings and Discussion

1. General Patterns of Epistemic Justification Revision in Contemporary Literature

The results of the literature review show that there is a general pattern that epistemic justification is no longer maintained in the form of static and final theories, both in foundationalism and coherentism. All the articles that are analyzed explicitly or implicitly reject the

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assumption that there is a single justification structure capable of solving all epistemic problems. Foundationalism and coherentism are both reconstructed as a framework that is revisable, contextual, and normative, rather than as an absolute model. The literature shows that the term "revision" is used to mark a change in basic assumptions, not just a technical modification. In this context, epistemic justification is presented as a dynamic process involving experience, inference, norms of rationality, and epistemic practice. No literature has been found that maintains foundationalism or classical coherentism without significant modifications. Thus, key data suggest that contemporary epistemology is moving towards a post-dichotomous paradigm that emphasizes conceptual flexibility and theoretical reflexivity; (Quine et al., n.d.) (Gondim, n.d.)

2. Revision of the Concept of Foundations in Contemporary Foundationalism

Literature findings show that contemporary foundationalism consistently abandons claims about infallible and self-justifying fundamental beliefs. The articles analyzed show a shift towards moderate foundationalism, where basic beliefs are understood as non-inferential yet remain fallible and open to correction. The epistemic foundation is no longer positioned as an absolute stopping point of epistemic regression, but rather as a functional starting point in the structure of justification. Perceptual experience is presented as a source of initial justification, but its justification is always associated with continued reflection and systemic integration. The literature also shows that epistemic foundations are often understood in phenomenological frameworks, rather than purely propositional. Thus, the foundation is represented as a condition of initial legitimacy, not as a guarantee of final truth. No defense of strong foundationalism was found in the literature reviewed; ; (SMITHIES 2014, n.d.) (Berghofer, 2019) (Vaassen, 2016)

3. Revision of the Concept of Coherence in Contemporary Coherentism

The results show that contemporary coherentism revises the concept of coherence significantly compared to its classical version. Coherence is no longer understood solely as a logical consistency or mutual support between beliefs, but rather as a multidimensional relational structure. The literature presents coherence in explanatory, probabilistic, phenomenological, and normative dimensions. The articles studied show that coherence acquires justifiatory power only when it is associated with the norm of rationality and epistemic responsibility of

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the subject. Coherence that is detached from the normative dimension is explicitly considered inadequate. In addition, contemporary coherentism adds a limiting mechanism to avoid destructive circularity. Thus, coherence is presented as an evaluative condition, not as a stand-alone source of justification. The literature also shows that coherence is always linked to actual epistemic practice, not just abstract structures; (Stoneham, n.d.) (Amaya, 2008) (Harvey, 2024)

4. Treatment of Epistemic Regression

Literature data show a significant change in the way epistemic regression is treated. None of the articles defended the claim that regression must be stopped absolutely to allow for epistemic justification. On the contrary, regression is presented as an acceptable structural phenomenon as long as it is not arbitrary or dogmatic. Moderate foundationalism accepts that epistemic foundations are temporary and do not stop regression in a final way. Normative coherentism manages regression through a reflective and responsible network of coherence. Some articles even show that regression can be reflective and not problematic within certain frameworks. Thus, epistemic regression is represented as an inherent feature of justification, not as a theoretical failure. The literature also shows that the focus shifts from "stopping regression" to "normatively managing regression". No model was found that claimed complete epistemic regression completion; (Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017) (Herzberg, 2014)

5. Emphasis on the Normative Dimension of Justification

The results of the study show that normativity is a central element in all epistemic justification revisions. Justification is no longer understood solely as a structural relationship between beliefs, but rather as a normative evaluation of the subject's epistemic practice. The literature consistently affirms the role of epistemic responsibility, reflective rationality, and adherence to epistemic norms. Both foundationalism and coherentism were revised to accommodate this normative dimension. Coherence is considered relevant only to the extent that it is generated through responsible practice, while epistemic foundations are valid only insofar as they can be accounted for reflectively. Normativity is also presented as a factor that distinguishes justification from mere psychological descriptions of beliefs. Thus, the data show a strong shift towards understanding justification as a normative practice. No literature has been found that reduces justification to causal mechanisms alone; ; . . (Amaya, 2008) (Muhammad+Andry, n.d.) (Mortini, 2025)

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6. Limitations of Foundationalism Revision

The literature analyzed explicitly notes limitations in the revision of foundationalism. Although moderate foundationalism avoids infallible dogmatism, it still maintains a distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs. The articles show that the privileged normative status of basic beliefs is often not adequately justified. Moreover, the fallible epistemic foundation raises questions about its normative legitimacy over other beliefs. The literature also notes the tension between non-inferentiality claims and reflective claims. Thus, the revision of foundationalism has not completely solved the metajustification problem. The data suggest that revised foundationalism still relies on implicit assumptions about experience or evidence. No consensus was found on the final normative basis of the epistemic foundation;) (SMITHIES_2014, n.d.) (Berghofer, 2019)

7. Limitations of Revision of Coherentism

The results of the study also show the limitations that persist in the revision of coherentism. Although normative coherentism manages to avoid simple circularity, the literature notes that normative standards of coherence are often assumed without independent justification. The articles show that the revised coherence remains dependent on the norm of rationality that is not always elaborated metajustically. The probabilistic and phenomenological approaches enrich the concept of coherence, but also add to the conceptual complexity. In addition, the literature notes that the relationship between coherence and truth remains indirect. Thus, revised coherentism has not completely escaped the problem of metajustification. The data show that coherentism still requires additional normative assumptions to function as a theory of justification; ; . . (Stoneham, n.d.) (Glass, 2006) (Koscholke & Jekel, 2017)

8. The Emergence of Hybrid Models and Alternative Approaches

The literature analyzed shows the emergence of various hybrid models and alternative approaches that blur the boundaries between foundationalism and coherentism. Foundherentism, phenomenological coherentism, probabilistic approaches, and naturalization of epistemology are presented in response to the limitations of classical theory. These models combine elements of foundation and coherence without affirming either exclusively. The articles show that the hybrid approach is not intended as a final theory, but rather as a revisional strategy. In addition, some literature rejects the classical justification framework as a whole and turns to a

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praxist or explanatory approach. Thus, the data show a plurality of approaches in contemporary epistemology. No alternative model has been found that claims to be able to completely replace all classical theories (; . (Rocheleau-Houle, n.d.) (Quine et al., n.d.)

9. Convergence Pattern between Foundationalism and Coherentism

The results of the synthesis show that there is a convergence pattern between the revision of foundationalism and coherentism. Both reject infallibility, acknowledge the fallibility of beliefs, and place normativity as a key element of justification. Foundations are revised to be contextual and temporary, while coherence is revised to be normative and responsible. The literature shows that the difference between the two positions is increasingly degree, not type. Thus, the data shows a blurring of conceptual boundaries that were previously firm. This convergence does not completely erase structural differences, but it does show the similarity of the direction of the revision. No literature has been found that maintains the absolute antagonism between foundationalism and coherentism. This pattern is one of the main findings of the study.

10. Summary of Synthesis Findings

Overall, the results of the study show that epistemic justification in the contemporary epistemological literature is represented as a normative, dynamic, and revisable process. Foundationalism and coherentism are both revised by abandoning their most problematic classical claims. The revision includes changes to the concepts of foundation, coherence, epistemic regression, and normativity of justification. However, the literature also shows that these revisions have not completely solved the problem of epistemic justification, especially at the metajustification level. The data show a strong tendency towards a hybrid and pluralistic approach. Thus, the synthesis of the results of this study presents the landscape of epistemic justification revision as reflected in contemporary literature without conducting evaluative interpretation.

Discussion Research Question 1 (RQ1)

How does the contemporary epistemological literature revise the concepts of epistemic justification in foundationalism and coherentism, particularly with regard to the basic assumptions about foundation, coherence, epistemic regression, and normativity of justification?

The findings of the study show that the contemporary epistemological literature consistently revises the concept

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of epistemic justification by rejecting the classical assumptions of foundationalism and coherentism that are rigid, absolute, and static. This revision is evident in the way that epistemic foundations are no longer understood as infallible and self-justifying fundamental beliefs, but rather as the starting point of justification that is fallible, contextual, and open to reflective correction. and shows that classical foundationalism's claim to halt epistemic regression through non-inferential beliefs cannot be sustained without falling into arbitrariness, thus driving a shift toward moderate foundationalism. The findings of this study are in line with an analysis that interprets Husserl as a proponent of epistemic foundations that are phenomenal and normative, but not absolute. Thus, the foundation was revised from a "final breaking point" to a functional "source of initial legitimacy". (SMITHIES 2014, n.d.) (Vaassen, 2016) (Berghofer, 2019)

In terms of coherence, the results of the study show a parallel revision of the concept of coherence. Coherence is no longer understood as merely consistency or mutual support between beliefs, as criticized by , but is reconstructed as a multidimensional structure involving explanatory, probabilistic, and normative relationships. These findings are in line with and suggesting that coherence cannot be reduced to a single size, but rather must be understood as a complex configuration. In addition, and emphasizing that coherence only has justifiatory power if it is bound to the epistemic responsibility and rational practice of the subject. Thus, coherentism is revised into a normative evaluative framework, not a stand-alone source of justification. (Stoneham, n.d.) (Glass, 2006) (Koscholke & Jekel, 2017) (Amaya, 2008) (Harvey, 2024)

Revisions also appear in the way the literature treats epistemic regression. It shows that both foundationalism and coherentism fail to stop regression in a non-arbitrary manner, so that regression is no longer positioned as a problem that must be eliminated, but rather as a structural phenomenon that must be managed. The findings of this study suggest that epistemic regression is revised to be an inherent part of reflective justification, rather than a theoretical threat. In this context, it shows that regression can even be coherent within certain probabilistic frameworks. Thus, the classical assumption about the necessity of regression termination is fundamentally revised. (Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017) (Herzberg, 2014)

The normative dimension of justification emerges as a central element in this entire revision. Christias (2015) and) show that the main problem of epistemic justification is not just the structure of

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beliefs, but rather the normative basis that underpins the claim of justification. The research findings confirm that both foundationalism and coherentism were revised to recognize the role of epistemic norms, subject responsibility, and meta-epistemic reflection. Thus, RQ1 is answered by showing that contemporary epistemological literature revises epistemic justification through a thorough transformation of the concepts of foundation, coherence, regression, and normativity, resulting in an understanding of justification as a dynamic and revisable normative process. (Mortini, 2025)

Discussion Research Question 2 (RQ2)

What are the conceptual and metajustificative limitations that are still maintained in the revisions of foundationalism and coherentism according to the contemporary literature, and why have they not fully resolved the problem of epistemic justification?

Although the literature shows significant revisions, the findings of this study reveal that conceptual and metajustifiative limitations persist in both traditions. In moderate foundationalism, the main limitation lies in the ambiguity of the privileged normative status of fundamental beliefs. asserts that even if non-inferential beliefs are accepted, the question of why those beliefs justify other beliefs still gives rise to regression at the normative level. and also shows that phenomenal experiential foundations face conceptual ambiguities regarding evidence and givenness. The findings of this study show that the revised foundationalism still maintains a fundamental–non-fundamental distinction without a fully explicit metatheoretical justification.(SMITHIES 2014, n.d.) (Berghofer, 2019) (Larsen, 2025)

In coherentism, the main limitation lies in the normative standard of coherence that is assumed. suggests that reflective circularity remains a threat if coherence is not limited by external norms. Although normative coherentism, as developed, succeeds in reinforcing the dimension of epistemic responsibility, it is judged that it still fails to provide a non-arbitrary metajustifying basis for the norm. The findings of this study confirm that revised coherentism still relies on implicit assumptions about rationality that are not fully meta-epistemically justified. (Stoneham, n.d.) (Amaya, 2008) (Muhammad+Andry, n.d.)

The limitations of cross-theory are also seen in the management of epistemic regression. It shows that foundationalism tends to be arbitrary, coherentism tends to be circular, and infinitism tends to be impractical. The findings of this study show that contemporary revisions are more successful at managing regression

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than resolving it, but such management often relies on pragmatic or normative assumptions that are not elaborated in depth. Thus, the problem of epistemic justification has not been resolved because these revisions are still operating within the framework of problematic classical epistemological assumptions.(Engelsma & Peijnenburg, 2017)

In addition, it shows that the concept of epistemic justification itself contains conceptual gaps that are rarely explicitly reflected. The findings of this study show that many revisions continue to use the term "justification" without adequate metatheoretical clarification, so that the problem of justification moves from the first theoretical level to the meta-conceptual level. Therefore, RQ2 is answered by showing that the limitations of epistemic revision are structural and metajustifiative, not merely technical, thus explaining why the problem of epistemic justification has not been fully solved.(Mortini, 2025)

Discussion Research Question 3 (RQ3)

How does the comparative synthesis of contemporary epistemological literature allow for the formulation of a revised framework of epistemic justification that goes beyond the classical dichotomy between foundationalism and coherentism without falling into dogmatism or epistemic relativism?

The comparative synthesis produced by this study shows that going beyond the classical dichotomy does not mean rejecting foundationalism and coherentism, but rather reconstructing them in a more reflective revisional framework. shows that knowledge is structural and global, so that justification claims cannot be reduced to individual foundations or internal coherence alone. The findings of this study show that foundations and coherence are revised into two complementary dimensions in the structure of epistemic justification. (Quine et al., n.d.)

Hybrid models such as foundherentism analyzed by and Ryan (2000) show that the integration of experience and inferential relations can avoid foundational dogmatism or coherent relativism. In addition, the probabilistic approach and phenomenological (Harvey, 2024) show that epistemic justification can be reconstructed without assuming an absolute foundation or total coherence. The findings of this study show that comparative synthesis allows the understanding of justification as a pluralistic normative process that still retains its evaluative power. (Rocheleau-Houle, n.d.) Glass, 2006) (Koscholke & Jekel, 2017) (Berghofer, 2019)

Thus, RQ3 is answered by showing that the framework of epistemic

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justification revision that goes beyond the classical dichotomy is non-dogmatic because it rejects absolute foundations, and non-relativistic because it maintains reflective normativity. This synthesis does not produce a single final theory, but a conceptual framework capable of integrating various approaches in contemporary epistemology.

Significance of Scientific Findings and Contributions

The main significance of this study lies in the shift in focus from theoretical evaluation to conceptual revision analysis. This research contributes to epistemology by showing that epistemic justification cannot be understood as a final state, but rather as a normative process that is always open to revision. The theoretical contribution of this research lies in the systematic mapping of the revision patterns of foundationalism and coherentism that were previously scattered and fragmentary. Thus, this research enriches the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary epistemology and clarifies the direction of development of epistemic justification discourse.

Research Implications

The theoretical implication of this study is the need for contemporary epistemology to adopt a revisional and pluralistic framework in discussing justification. The methodological implication is the legitimacy of the comparative literature study approach as a means of metatheoretical reflection. The conceptual implication is the need for continued clarification of the concept of epistemic justification itself.

Research Limitations

The main limitation of this study lies in its exclusive focus on the theoretical literature without empirical or experimental analysis. In addition, this study does not propose a new theory of justification substantively, but rather a conceptual synthesis. However, this limitation at the same time confirms the position of the research as a reflective-metatheoretical study.

D. Conclusion

This study concludes that contemporary epistemological literature consistently revises the concept of epistemic justification by abandoning the classical assumptions of foundationalism and coherentism that are static, absolute, and exclusive. Key findings suggest that foundationalism is reformulated into a moderate form that recognizes the role of foundations as a fallible and revisable source of initial legitimacy, while coherentism is revised into a normative framework that emphasizes multidimensional coherence and epistemic responsibility of subjects. In addition,

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epistemic regression is no longer understood as a problem that must be definitively stopped, but rather as a structural phenomenon that is managed reflexively in the practice of justification. The normative dimension emerges as a central element that unites the revision of both traditions, confirming that epistemic justification cannot be reduced to formal structures or causal mechanisms alone. The study also found that although these revisions were significant, metajustificative limitations persisted, particularly with regard to the normative basis of the foundations and standards of coherence. Thus, this study confirms that epistemic justification in contemporary epistemology is best understood as a normative process that is dynamic, pluralistic, and open to continuous revision.

The contribution of this research to the scientific field of epistemology lies in the comparative and systematic mapping of the pattern of epistemic justification revision that was previously fragmentarily scattered in the literature. Instead of reproducing the classical debate about the superiority of foundationalism or coherentism, this study shifts the focus of discourse to an analysis of how the two traditions are reconstructed in the context of contemporary epistemology. By placing revision as the main object of analysis, this study provides a reflective framework that clarifies the direction of development of epistemic justification theory without making dogmatic theoretical claims. This contribution is metatheoretical in that it helps to explain why the problem of epistemic justification persists despite various revisions. In addition, this study enriches epistemology by showing that the obscuration of classical dichotomy is not a theoretical weakness, but a structural feature of contemporary epistemology. Thus, this study emphasizes the relevance of revisional and comparative approaches as productive conceptual strategies in the philosophy of knowledge.

Future Research Suggestions

Based on the findings of this study, future research is suggested to deepen the metajustificative analysis of the normative concepts used in various revisions of foundationalism and coherentism. Much contemporary literature recognizes the importance of epistemic norms, but has not explicitly explained the basis for such normative legitimacy. Further research can focus on conceptual clarification of the status of epistemic norms, both in internalistic and preliminary-sensitive frameworks. In addition, an in-depth study of the relationship between epistemic normativity and practical rationality also has the potential to enrich the understanding of justification as a reflective practice. Thus, future research can help bridge the gap between justification theory and actual epistemic practice.

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Further research can also expand the scope of methodology by combining the study of conceptual literature with other approaches, such as historical-philosophical analysis or conceptual studies across philosophical traditions. For example, further exploration of pre-contemporary sources that challenge the foundationalism–coherentism dichotomy can provide additional perspectives for epistemic revisions. In addition, future research could examine more systematically the hybrid and pluralistic models that emerge in the literature, not only as technical solutions, but as expressions of the paradigm shift in epistemology itself. Comparative studies between hybrid models can also help assess the extent to which these approaches truly transcend the limitations of classical theory. With this kind of research direction, the epistemic justification discourse can continue to evolve reflectively, critically, and openly to conceptual renewal.

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